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Abstract. This paper discusses a new method for ﬂood risk
assessment in river deltas. Flood risk analysis of river deltas
is complex, because both storm surges and river discharges
may cause ﬂooding and the effect of upstream breaches on
downstream water levels and ﬂood risk must be taken into
account. This paper presents a Monte Carlo-based ﬂood risk
analysis framework for policy making, which considers both
storm surges and river ﬂood waves and includes effects from
hydrodynamic interaction on ﬂood risk. It was applied to
analyse societal ﬂood fatality risk in the Rhine–Meuse delta.
1 Introduction
The National Water Plan (NWP) in the Netherlands requires
a reconsideration of ﬂood risk management standards based
on cost beneﬁt analyses and fatality (loss of life) risk assess-
ments (Ministerie van Verkeer and Waterstaat, 2009). The
NWP induced an extensive research programme into ﬂood
risk and in particular ﬂood fatality risk in the Netherlands.
Fatality risk also attracts increasing attention in ﬂood risk
management and research in other countries, such as France
(Lalande, 2012), the USA (US Department of the Interior,
2011), the UK (Di Mauro and De Bruijn, 2012), Belgium
(IMDC, 2005) and Indonesia (Marchand et al., 2009).
Flood fatality risk can be assessed both from an individ-
ual and societal point of view. The individual ﬂood fatality
risk relates to the probability of a person dying as a result of
a ﬂood event at a certain location. This perspective focuses
on hazardous locations without taking into account the pop-
ulation density at those locations. Individual risks have been
assessed for the Netherlands as part of the implementation of
the NWP (De Bruijn et al., 2010; Beckers et al., 2012).
Societal ﬂood fatality risk is related to the probability of
events with many fatalities. It is expressed by an FN curve,
which gives the annual probability of an event with N or
more fatalities (De Bruijn et al., 2010). It combines informa-
tion on ﬂood hazards, ﬂood extents and population density
in ﬂood-prone areas. In the Netherlands, the Rhine–Meuse
delta (both the tidal- and non-tidal part) contributes most to
the societal ﬂood fatality risk (Beckers and De Bruijn, 2011;
Beckers et al., 2012).
This paper focuses on the development of a method to
analyse societal ﬂood fatality risks in river deltas with ﬂood
protection infrastructure, such as the Rhine–Meuse delta.
The method needs to be able to calculate the societal ﬂood
fatality risk under current and future conditions, including
effects of various ﬂood risk management strategies.
To be applicable, the method should comply with three re-
quirements. Firstly, it must be applicable to an area as large
as the (Dutch part) of the Rhine–Meuse delta. Secondly, it
should account for the most relevant processes which deter-
mine the number of ﬂood fatalities per event. Since in the
Netherlands ﬂoods are caused by defence breaches, the ﬂood
extent of an event is linked to the number and locations of
defence breaches.
To obtain a realistic estimate of the number and location of
breaches (and the corresponding consequences), the hydro-
dynamic interaction between locations needs to be taken into
account. By hydrodynamic interaction we mean the decrease
of water levels at potential breach locations due to a breach
elsewhere in the river system. This decrease of water levels
may have a signiﬁcant effect on the failure probabilities of
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(downstream) ﬂood defences and thus on ﬂood risk in ﬂuvial
systems (Van Mierlo et al., 2007; Apel et al., 2009; Voro-
gushyn et al., 2010). Secondly, since upstream breaches may
also inﬂuence the ﬂood probabilities in the tidal river part,
an integrated analysis of both the river-dominated and the
tidal part of the delta must be carried out. Hydrodynamic in-
teraction is generally not relevant in areas where a ﬂooding
will not cause a reduction of water levels in the water ways,
such as in coastal systems. A third requirement is that the
method should facilitate the analysis of societal ﬂood risks
corresponding with various potential ﬂood risk management
strategies.
The method should result in an accurate FN curve, poten-
tial numbers of fatalities for the whole system, insight into
the contributions of different subareas and insight into the
most relevant ﬂood events (set of breach locations, river dis-
charges and sea water levels). These results support the con-
sideration of societal ﬂood fatality risks in the decision on
ﬂood protection standards and ﬂood risk management strate-
gies.
This paper presents and discusses the method that was de-
veloped to meet these requirements and its application on
societal ﬂood fatality risks in the Rhine–Meuse delta. The
method may also be used to analyse economic risks and the
approach is also applicable to other river deltas.
2 Existing ﬂood risk assessment methods
Various methods have been developed to analyse ﬂood risks
in deltas protected by ﬂood defences and the impact of ﬂood
risk management strategies on those ﬂood risks. Approaches
usually include an analysis of possible loads or threats, anal-
ysis of the reliability of the protection infrastructure, analysis
of breach sizes or breach growth given failure, modelling of
the expected ﬂood patterns and assessments of the associ-
ated consequences. Most methods are quantitative, but there
are qualitative methods which focus on mapping the most
important risk factors and combine them to a qualitative in-
dication of risk. The “risky places” method which identiﬁes
areas where many fatalities may occur is an example of such
methods (De Bruijn and Klijn, 2009). To explain the need
for a new method for societal risk analysis of river deltas, we
provide a brief overview of existing approaches.
To quantify ﬂood risks, both deterministic and probabilis-
tic methods may be used. In deterministic approaches risk is
assessed by simulating a single “design” event instead of the
whole range of possible events, and subsequent assessment
of the corresponding ﬂood patterns and impacts. When a cer-
tain probability is assigned to the design event, the approach
is sometimes referred to as “semi-probabilistic”, because it
does take probabilities into account to some extent. Since
the full range of possible outcomes is not explored in this
approach, the actual risk may be a grossly under- or over-
estimated. The approach is generally applied in explorative
analyses in which for example effects of climate change on
ﬂood risks are studied, when various long-term strategies are
compared, or when the areas with highest ﬂood risk must be
identiﬁed.Theymayalsobeusedintheanalysisofmeasures.
Then mostly an uncertainty or robustness factor is added to
the outcome to take into account uncertainties. These deter-
ministic approaches have the potential to deal with detailed
information e.g. from 2-D ﬂood inundation models, but may
also be based on indicative maps of the most important ﬂood
hazard and ﬂood vulnerability indicators. Examples of de-
terministic approaches are the quantiﬁcation of numbers of
fatalities given ﬂood hazard information, such as the “de-
terministic framework for the assessment of injury and loss
of life to ﬂoods” of Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005), the ex-
ploratory nation-wide fatality risk assessment in the Nether-
lands (Jonkman et al., 2008), the analysis for the second sus-
tainability outlook of the Netherlands (Klijn et al., 2012),
the long-term ﬂood risk management strategy research for
the Scheldt Estuary (De Bruijn et al., 2008) and tsunami risk
modelling (Marchand et al., 2009).
2.1 Probabilistic approaches
Comprehensive ﬂood risk analyses require the consideration
of uncertainties in both hazards and vulnerability parameters,
which is only possible in probabilistic approaches (Sayers
et al., 2002; Apel et al., 2004; Gouldby et al., 2013; Voro-
gushyn et al., 2010; Van Mierlo et al., 2007). Probabilistic
approaches are based on the awareness that most data and
models are uncertain and that these uncertainties can be ex-
pressed in probability density functions. The outcome of a
probabilistic approach may for example be a probability of
failure, the probability of exceedance of a certain parame-
ter, or a loss exceedance curve (a curve which gives the an-
nual probability of events with more than X euro damage).
Probabilistic approaches are being used in ﬂood risk man-
agement, for example in the national risk assessments of the
Netherlands (VNK2) (Jongejan et al., 2011; Den Heijer and
Diermanse, 2012) and in the UK (Hall et al. 2005). For the
analysis of societal risk in the Rhine–Meuse delta, we need a
probabilistic approach to be able to account for the complex
interactionsandthecombinedthreatofbothstormsurgesand
river discharges. We brieﬂy describe some existing proba-
bilistic approaches here and their shortcomings in relation to
our needs.
In the Dutch National Risk assessment project (VNK2)
economic and fatality risks of “dike rings” (areas surrounded
by levees or higher grounds) in the Netherlands are being
studied by ﬁrst analysing defence section failure probabili-
ties, as a result of various failure mechanisms, followed by
an integration of the failure probabilities of many defence
sections to the failure probability of the dike ring. This proce-
dure requires knowledge or assumptions on the correlations
between failures at different locations. The consequences as-
sociated with defence failure at each location are taken into
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account to derive a total ﬂood risk per dike ring area. The
VNK project does not consider the combined risk for the
Rhine–Meuse delta or the Netherlands as a whole, but fo-
cuses on results per dike ring. The effect of breaches in other
dike rings is not taken into account, which may cause a sig-
niﬁcant overestimation of the ﬂood risk.
For the preliminary large-scale risk assessment of England
and Wales also a probabilistic approach was developed (Hall
et al., 2005). Gouldby et al. (2013) slightly adapted the ap-
proach and studied fatality risks. In these approaches, load
reduction at downstream defence sections due to defence
failures in the system was not taken into account. The ap-
proach of Hall et al. (2005) and Gouldby et al. (2013) is suit-
able for coastal defence structures and for small river valleys.
However, for ﬂuvial systems such as large rivers and estuar-
ies where the effect of water retention on ﬂood probabilities
andﬂood risksmay be signiﬁcant,this retention effectshould
be taken into account.
2.2 Why consider hydrodynamic interaction
In large river systems, the probability of breaching in one
of the downstream dike rings depends on what happens up-
stream in a way that cannot be approximated by an assump-
tion of full dependency or independency. Especially for so-
cietal risk, which requires the total number of fatalities per
event and thus the number of breaches per event, the consid-
eration of hydrodynamic interaction is important. The effect
of hydrodynamic interaction on ﬂood probabilities and ﬂood
risk depends on the spatial variation of the hydraulic load
and strength of the ﬂood defences, the moment at which a
defence breaks (beginning/peak or after the peak of a ﬂood
wave), and the available storage volume of the ﬂood-prone
areas in relation to the discharge volume in the river. The ef-
fect of a breach on downstream water levels and thus ﬂood
probabilities can be signiﬁcant, as Olson and Morton (2012)
and Apel et al. (2009) described. In the Mississippi River in
2011 the US Army made a breach and used the New Madrid
Floodway to lower the water levels in the river with about
80cm (Olson and Morton, 2012).
There are studies which include hydrodynamic interac-
tion in ﬂood hazard analysis. Apel et al. (2004) and Van
Mierlo et al. (2007) provided methods to include the ef-
fect of hydrodynamic interaction in risk analysis and their
work was improved in time (Apel et al., 2009; Vrouwen-
velder et al., 2010). Apel et al. (2009) continued on the
work of Apel et al. (2004) and studied the effect of up-
stream defence breaches on downstream ﬂood frequencies
for the Rhine River from Cologne to Rees. They used a prob-
abilistic method to show that defence breaches have a sig-
niﬁcant effect on downstream discharges and on the proba-
bility of exceedance of design discharge levels. By consid-
ering hydrodynamic interaction, the 1:5000 year discharge
at location Rees (at the Dutch–German border) reduces from
17500m3 s−1 to about 15500m3 s−1. The effect of this re-
duction on ﬂood risks was not studied.
Van Mierlo et al. (2007) developed an approach to in-
corporate hydrodynamic interaction in risk analysis and
Vrouwenvelder et al. (2010) applied it on a dike ring in the
Rhine–Meuse delta in the Netherlands. They calculated ﬂood
probabilities at predeﬁned potential breach locations without
consideration of hydrodynamic interaction, then they sam-
pled river ﬂood waves and assessed whether the sampled
ﬂood waves could result in one or more breaches. If so, the
ﬂood waves were simulated with the 2-D Sobek overland
model (Dhondia and Stelling, 2004; Hesselink et al., 2003) to
determine the ﬂood pattern. The consequences of the ﬂood-
ing were determined with the Standard Dutch Damage and
Fatality Model (HIS-SSM, Kok et al., 2005). Finally, the risk
wasassessedasthesumofthedamagedividedbythenumber
of samples. Their approach was computationally very time-
consuming. One Monte Carlo simulation took about 2 to 6
days per run (2GHz Linux PC in 2010). Such a long calcu-
lation time for one defence strength means that this method
is not feasible for the analysis of a complete river system.
Vorogushyn et al. (2010) developed a method to include
hydrodynamic interaction in hazard assessment and applied
it on the Elbe River. They calculated hazard maps using a
Monte Carlo analysis and coupled three models in a dynamic
way: (1) a 1-D unsteady hydrodynamic model for river rout-
ing, (2) a probabilistic defence breach model to determine
possibledefencebreachlocations,breachgrowthandtheout-
ﬂow of discharges and (3) a 2-D (storage cell) based inunda-
tion model for the protected parts of the ﬂood plains. The
method resulted in probabilistic ﬂood hazard maps for four
“hazardscenarios”(forrecurrencetimesof100,200,500and
1000 years) and for different ﬂood hazard parameters. Voro-
gushyn et al. (2010) thus focused on ﬂood hazards and did
not consider ﬂood impacts or risks. Vorogushyn et al. (2012)
applied the method of Vorogushyn et al. (2010) to analyse
the effects of a ﬂood detention area and to do so, added dam-
age assessment to the method. They study the uncertainties
in damage per “hazard scenario” by taking into account the
uncertainties in ﬂood depths and by calculating damage with
different damage assessment models. Finally, they integrated
the four hazard scenario outcomes to one risk ﬁgure. They
did not sample from the whole discharge probability density
function.
The approach of Vorogushyn et al. (2010, 2012) is appli-
cable to river areas. However, it is difﬁcult to apply in river
deltas where both storm surges and river discharges are rel-
evant, since it is impossible to deﬁne one hazard scenario
as the once-in-1000-year hazard scenario for the delta as
a whole: in the upstream part the once-in-1000-year water
level will be related to the once-in-1000-year discharge, near
the coast it will be related to the one-in-1000-year sea wa-
ter level, while in the transition area between the tidal and
non-tidal area events such as the 1/10 year water level in
combination with a 1/10 year river discharge might produce
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the 1/1000 year water level. For delta areas thus a different
approach is needed which considers the whole range of pos-
sible sea water levels and river discharges in an integrated
way.
In Beckers and De Bruijn (2011), a probabilistic approach
was used to assess the societal ﬂood fatality risk in the
Netherlands. They considered correlation between breaches
and hydrodynamic interaction in the river area by using esti-
mated correlation factors between dike rings and by expert
assumptions on the retention effect of breaches on down-
stream breach probabilities. The hydrodynamic interaction
of breach locations on downstream ﬂood probabilities must
thus be known beforehand. An event tree of all combinations
of dike ring ﬂood scenarios was constructed to evaluate the
probability of a given number of fatalities. In order to keep
the computational effort feasible, the dike rings were used
as basic elements in the event tree, instead of the far more
numerous defence sections. Furthermore, the tidal river area
was considered independent from the non-tidal river area.
The results of this study showed that the river area (tidal
and non-tidal together) contributes most to the ﬂood fatal-
ity risks in the Netherlands (De Bruijn et al., 2010; Beckers
et al., 2012). Weak points in this study were the assumptions
needed for the correlation between breaching of dike rings
andtheuseofdikeringsasbasicunitsintheeventtree,where
individual defence sections would be more appropriate. The
ﬂood probabilities and ﬂood consequences vary signiﬁcantly
between the different defence sections within one dike ring.
This variation is lost when averages are used.
2.3 What we need to add
To assess societal risks of river deltas we cannot follow an
approach which focuses on dike rings independently from
what happens in other dike rings as was done by Jongejan et
al. (2012), nor can we assume full correlation between dif-
ferent defence sections as done for the UK (Hall et al., 2005;
Gouldby et al., 2013). Instead, we need to include the effects
of hydrodynamic interaction on ﬂood probabilities to get ac-
curate estimates of the location and number of breaches and
fatalities. The existing approaches to include hydrodynamic
effects are either to complex and calculation time demand-
ing to apply on a large scale (Vrouwenvelder et al., 2010),
basedonassumptions(Beckersetal.,2012)ortheyaredevel-
oped for areas without tidal or storm surge inﬂuences (Voro-
gushyn et al., 2010). In river deltas where discharges and
storm surges and combinations of both may cause ﬂooding,
it is not possible to directly link water levels with a certain
probability,e.gtheonce-in-1000-yearwaterlevel,toahazard
scenario, such as the once-in-1000-year discharge as Voro-
gushyn et al. (2010) could do for the Elbe River. There is
no such thing as “the” once-in-1000-year event. The proba-
bility of water levels of downstream locations is dominated
by storm surges, the water levels of upstream locations by
river discharges and the water level probabilities within the
transition part are inﬂuenced both by storm surges and river
discharges. Therefore, an approach which jointly considers
discharges and storm surges needs to be developed for such
areas. Furthermore, most existing approaches focus on ﬂood
hazards, or economic risks. Our approach focuses on fatal-
ity risks and therefore also needs evacuation success as an
uncertain input variable.
3 The probabilistic risk assessment method as applied
to the Rhine–Meuse delta
3.1 Overview
This paper discusses a method which provides an FN curve
to assess societal risk which is applicable to river deltas with
a ﬂood defence infrastructure. It takes into account the effect
of breaches on downstream ﬂood hazards, ﬂood probabilities
and risks, and it jointly considers all relevant threats (storm
surges, river ﬂows and the behaviour of storm surge barriers).
It includes the analysis of fatalities due to breaches and takes
into account evacuation of people. The analysis of societal
risks on this spatial scale, for river deltas threatened both by
storm surges and river discharges, taking into account hydro-
dynamic effects of breaches, has not been carried out before.
The method allows the analysis of societal risk correspond-
ing with different ﬂood risk management strategies.
Our method is based on Monte Carlo simulation (MCS).
To accelerate the simulation an advanced importance sam-
pling technique is used for the sampling of load variables
(sea water levels, river discharges at the upper boundary and
the functioning of the storm surge barrier) and the ﬂood plain
modelling is simpliﬁed (see Sects. 3.3 and 3.4).
A schematic overview of the probabilistic risk assess-
ment method is provided in Fig. 1. Besides pre- and post-
processing of input and output data, it consists of three main
steps, which are explained in the following sections:
1. sampling of the load, strength and evacuation response
variables;
2. the hydrodynamic modelling of the sampled events to
see where breaches occur;
3. the translation of the model outcomes to ﬂood fatalities
per breach location and per sampled event.
The most important outputs are FN curves, Potential Loss of
Life (expected annual number of fatalities) for the area as a
whole and the contributions of the three subzones (tidal, non-
tidal and transition zone) to the total risk.
3.2 Schematisation and data requirements for the
Rhine–Meuse delta
The case study of the Rhine–Meuse delta includes all main
branches in the Rhine and Meuse delta between Lobith
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Monte Carlo Analysis
Input: Design failure probabilities of all dike stretches
Pre-processing: Adjust fragility curves to the user
defined failure probability
1. Sampling:
Sample for N representative years:
• annual max Qriver & corresponding Hsea
• annual max Hsea & corresponding Qriver
Sample for each event (2 per year):
• strength value for each potential breach location,
• evacuation % for the tidal, non-tidal and
transition area
Data requirements:
• Statistics of Qriver,
Hsea, evacuation
• Fragility curves of
levees at all potential
breach locations
• Model
schematisation
• Flood fatalities given
a breach for each
potential breach
location
2. Hydrodynamic simulation of sampled loads and
strengths
3. Translation of results to fatality numbers per
event
Post processing: Calculate FN curve and PLL
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the probabilistic risk assessment method for river deltas.
(along the Rhine at the German–Dutch boundary), Lith
(along the Meuse), Maasmond and the IJssel lake and the
surrounding ﬂood-prone areas (see Fig. 2).
To model potential dike breaches and their consequences,
171 potential breach locations have been deﬁned (see Fig. 2).
Each of these locations is representative of a defence stretch
with a length varying from 400m to about 34km. The poten-
tial breach locations were selected based on their expected
consequences in the case of a failure. If somewhere a breach
is expected to result in signiﬁcantly different ﬂood impacts
than a neighbouring breach, an additional breach location
was deﬁned. In areas with secondary embankments, or where
land use differs from place to place or areas with a signiﬁcant
slope, more breaches are selected than in ﬂat homogeneous
polder areas (Kok and Van der Doef, 2008). The length of
the defence stretch for which the location is representative is
taken into account in the probability (in general longer em-
bankments have a larger failure probability if everything else
is equal). For each defence stretch a fragility curve is derived
which provides the probability of failure anywhere along the
defence stretch as a function of the river water level. Details
on these are provided in the following sections.
The probabilistic framework is used to assess the societal
ﬂood risk for different sets of potential ﬂood protection stan-
dards. The ﬂood protection standards are, therefore, deﬁned
as input per defence section. In these protection standards,
the effect of hydrodynamic interaction is not taken into ac-
count: they provide the ﬂood probability per dike section
if only that section could fail. A defence section can con-
tain one or more potential breach locations. The mean val-
ues of the fragility curves of the potential breach locations
are shifted in an iterative procedure to ensure that the fail-
Figure 2. Map of the Rhine–Meuse delta with the boundaries of the
studied area (Lobith, Lith, IJssellake, North Sea), the three zones
dominated by different ﬂood types (tidal zone, non-tidal zone and
transition zone), and the potential breach locations (red dots).
ure probabilities of each defence section correspond with the
user-deﬁned protection standard (see Sect. 3.3.2).
3.3 Sampling load, strength and evacuation response
parameters
The probabilistic method is based on MCS for load, strength
and evacuation fraction. The MCS method was chosen be-
cause of the large number of breach locations for which de-
fence strengths need to be sampled. Other probabilistic tech-
niques, such as numerical integration or FORM, are less ef-
ﬁcient for large numbers of random variables (De Bruijn and
Diermanse, 2013; Diermanse et al., 2014).
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3.3.1 Sampling load parameters
Flooding in the Dutch Rhine and Meuse delta is caused by
storm surges and by extreme river discharges coming from
the upstream catchments of the Rhine and Meuse rivers. In
the tidal river area, ﬂoods are not only linked to the storm
surge severity, but also to the functioning of the storm surge
barrier near the Maasmond, the Maeslant Barrier. The Rhine
delta can be subdivided into three areas based on the event
type which contributes most to the ﬂood risk (see Fig. 2):
1. the river-dominated area, which may become ﬂooded
due to high discharges in the Rhine or Meuse river;
2. the tidal area, where the inﬂuence of storm surges is
dominant: in this area, ﬂooding may occur when a storm
surge raises the local water levels and the storm surge
barrier fails to close;
3. the transition zone: the area where ﬂooding may occur
due to a combination of a storm surge and a high river
ﬂood wave at the same time.
To obtain accurate ﬂood risk estimates, ﬂood events of all
three types must be represented well. For each event, four
variables are sampled in the MCS, which together determine
the hydraulic load: the discharge of the Rhine River at Lo-
bith, near the German border, the discharge of the Meuse
River at the upstream location Lith, the sea water level at
the Maasmond and the functioning of the Maeslant Barrier.
For each simulated year two types of events are sampled:
– a combination of an extreme river discharge and coin-
ciding sea water level: the extreme river discharge is
sampled from the annual maxima distribution and the
sea water level from the distribution of tidal peak sea
water levels.
– a combination of an extreme sea water level and co-
inciding river discharge: the extreme sea water level is
sampled from the distribution of annual maximum sea
levels and the river discharge from the daily river dis-
charge statistics.
The general expression for the distribution function of an-
nual maximum discharges of the Rhine and Meuse rivers is
the Generalized Extreme Value distribution Type I (Gumbel).
Thecoefﬁcientsa andb areﬁttedtoaseriesofapproximately
100 annual maxima that is corrected for anthropogenic and
natural changes in the river bed over the years (De Bruijn and
Diermanse, 2013):
P (Q < q) = exp

−exp

−
q −b
a

. (1)
The ﬁtted coefﬁcients are a = 1316.45m3 s−1, b =
6612.5m3 s−1 for the Rhine River at Lobith and a =
342.12m3 s−1 and b = 1190.34m3 s−1 for the Meuse River
at Lith. The daily discharges were sampled directly from an
observed time series of approximately 100 years. The river
discharges of Rhine and Meuse are correlated. The correla-
tion of 0.6 is taken into account by sampling combinations
of Rhine and Meuse discharge from a Gaussian copula with
correlation equal to 0.6.
For the annual maximum water level, the conditional
Weibull distribution is used to describe (non-) exceedance
probabilities of annual maximum sea water levels at Maas-
mond:
P (M ≤ m|m > ω) = 1−exp
h
(ω/σ)ξ −
 
h

σ
ξi
, (2)
where M is the annual maximum sea water level (in me-
tres above datum, in this case NAP), m is a potential real-
ization of M and ω, σ and ξ are the location, scale and shape
parameter respectively. Exceedance frequencies of high sea
water levels can be derived by multiplying the probabil-
ities that follow from Eq. (2) with the frequency of ex-
ceedance, λ, of threshold ω. The value of λ is determined
by counting the number of peaks above the threshold and
dividing by the number of years of record. Their values
are in this case: ω = 1.97m+NAP, λ = 7.237year-1, ξ =
0.57m+NAP, σ = 0.0157m+NAP.
The daily sea water level conditions, which are used to
sample the sea water level coinciding with an annual max-
imum discharge, are derived from histograms of observed
tidal peak water levels (Diermanse et al., 2014). The high
river discharge wave lasts for several weeks and even the
peakofthewavemay last severaldays.Thisdurationmustbe
taken into account in the probability distribution from which
the peak sea water level is sampled. We used a simpliﬁed ap-
proach to take this duration effect into account. We assumed
that the combination of high sea water level and high river
discharge can occur during a period of K tidal periods and,
assuming the hydrograph is symmetric, starts at K/2 tidal
periods before the peak discharge and ends at K/2 periods
after the peak discharge. The default value of K is chosen to
be 12, i.e. about 6.5 days. This value is also used in standard
Dutch probability assessment tool PCRING (Steenbergen et
al., 2004). The value of K is applied in the sampling proce-
dure of the (peak) sea water level. The probability distribu-
tion function, FS(s), for the peak sea water level for a single
tidal period is
FS(s) = P [S < s]. (3)
In the Monte Carlo procedure, the maximum sea water level
of a period of K tidal periods will be sampled. This value has
the following distribution function:
F∗
S(s) = P [S < s]K = (FS(s))K . (4)
The assumed duration K thus inﬂuences the distribution
function from which the maximum sea water level is sam-
pled. An increase in the value of K increases the probability
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of higher peak sea water levels being sampled. This is ex-
actly the duration effect that needed to be incorporated in the
approach: the longer the duration of a high discharge event,
the higher the probability that the sea water level exceeds a
given high threshold. A detailed description on the sampling
techniques is provided in Diermanse et al. (2014).
Maeslant barrier
The functioning of the Maeslant Barrier is also sampled for
each scenario. There are two possibilities: if the barrier func-
tions, it closes upon request – that is if the water level at Rot-
terdam exceeds 3m+NAP; if a failing storm surge barrier
is sampled, the barrier will not close. The probability that a
non-functioning barrier is sampled is 1% per event.
Importance sampling
The efﬁciency of the MCS is enhanced by importance sam-
pling. The approach followed to obtain an effective sampling
strategy differs from the adaptive sampling schemes as used
by for example Steenackers et al. (2009), Allaix and Car-
bone (2011) and Dawson and Hall (2006). In those schemes
the sampling density function h(x) is iteratively adapted by
assigning larger sampling densities to events that contribute
most to the ﬂood risk in earlier iterations. However, for our
decision-making process, not only the ﬂood risk of the en-
tire delta area is required, but also the ﬂood risk of all the
individual polder areas that are protected by ﬂood defences.
Based on knowledge of the system, a sampling strategy was
selected which gives accurate results in all subareas (Dier-
manse et al., 2014) and a reasonable convergence of the risk
estimate.
In this sampling strategy, the original probability distribu-
tion for the maximum sea water levels, f(x), is replaced by
a uniform distribution function h(x). This leads to all water
levels being equally sampled. The same is done for the distri-
bution of annual and daily peak discharges. The distribution
of daily sea water levels is replaced by a composite function
in which both peak water levels and intermediate water levels
are represented well. Finally, the sampling failure probabil-
ity of the Maeslant Barrier was increased from 1 to 10%,
since especially the situations with a failing storm surge bar-
rier contribute signiﬁcantly to the ﬂood risk in the western
part of the tidal river area. Because the sampling does not
use the actual distribution function, the estimator of the fail-
ure probability as applied in Crude Monte Carlo needs to be
adapted:
ˆ Pf =
N P
i=1
I(Z(x))
f(x)
h(x)
N
, (5)
where is the estimate of Pf, I is the indicator function (I = 1
if Z < 0, and 0 otherwise. Z is a limit state function which
represents failure. Failure occurs when Z < 0). f(x) is the
tide
surge
waterlevel
time 4.5 hours
Figure 3. The sea water level is determined by tide and storm surge.
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Figure 4. The fragility curves for the location Spijk upstream along
the Rhine River.
probability density function, and h(x) the sampling function.
In the translation of the outcomes, the weights of the samples
are thus corrected by the factor equal to f(x)/h(x). Dier-
manse et al. (2014) discuss the sampling strategy in detail.
IntheMCS,atotalof2000eventsweresampled(twosam-
pled events for 1000 representative years).
Translation to time series
In order to translate each sampled peak value into a time-
dependent discharge time series, a standard hydrograph
shape was used (De Bruijn and Diermanse, 2013). The river
ﬂood wave shape used is equal to the standard ﬂood wave
applied to calculate the ofﬁcial Dutch design water levels
for ﬂood defences (Ministerie van Verkeer and Waterstaat,
2007). The peak of the Rhine discharge at Lobith is assumed
to occur at the same time as the peak of the Meuse discharge
at Lith. A standard sea water level hydrograph was derived
from a combination of a standard tidal pattern and a storm
surge hydrograph. The phase difference between the peak of
the astronomic tide and the peak of the storm surge is ﬁxed at
−4.5h, which is in accordance with the assumptions in the
statutory safety assessment (HR2006, WTI2011). Figure 3
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Figure 5. Convergence of the probability of exceedance of events with more than 10, 100, 5000 and 1000 fatalities (left) and the annual
number of fatalities (right).
illustrates the hydrograph of the tide, storm surge and the
combined sea water level. The peak of the sea water level oc-
curs 2 days after the peak of the river discharge. This implies
that the peaks arrive approximately at the same time in the
transition area, i.e. the area that is inﬂuenced by both river
discharges and sea level. For a detailed explanation we refer
to De Bruijn and Diermanse (2013).
3.3.2 Sampling strength parameters
In the Rhine–Meuse delta area, 171 potential breach loca-
tions were identiﬁed (see Fig. 2 and Sect. 3.2). The strength
of each defence stretch at each potential breach location is
expressed by the lowest water level which causes the defence
to fail. For each event, this critical water level is sampled
for all potential breach locations from the fragility curves of
those locations. Fragility curves describe the probability of a
breach as a function of the water level (H). Figure 4 shows
as an example the fragility curves for location Spijk, near the
upstream Rhine boundary. The shape of the fragility curve
differs per failure mechanism. In this paper, overtopping,
macro-instability and piping were considered. The fragility
curve of piping is less steep than the one for overtopping,
which means that failure can occur due to a wider range of
water levels. For defence sections for which piping is dom-
inant the uncertainty on the strength of the embankment, or
the maximum water level which the embankment can still
resist, is thus rather larger. This uncertainty is caused by the
inﬂuence of other factors besides water level, such as the du-
ration of the high water level and various geotechnical char-
acteristics of the ﬂood defence.
The fragility curves were constructed based on data of the
subsoil and data of the ﬂood defences such as the outer slope,
the crest width and the presence of a ditch. The Dike Assess-
ment Module (DAM module) was used to construct “typi-
cal Dutch defences” which correspond to the Dutch safety
standards and design criteria on which Dutch defences are
based (Van der Meij, 2013; De Bruijn et al., 2014). Next,
DAM was used to calculate the probability of failure corre-
sponding with a certain water level. This was repeated for
a range of water levels to obtain the fragility curve (Van
der Meij and Lopez de la Cruz, 2013). The fragility curves
obtained in this procedure were discussed with experts (De
Bruijn et al., 2014). The sensitivity of the FN curve and of
the identiﬁed most relevant defence sections (sections which
contribute most to the societal risks) for a range of realistic
fragility curves was found to be low (De Bruijn et al., 2014).
The fragility curves are subsequently adapted in order to
make sure that they comply with the user-provided ﬂood pro-
tection standards. To adapt the fragility curves, ﬁrst the lo-
cal water level statistics at each breach location were derived
based on 154 model simulations without breaches with dif-
ferent load combinations (7 sea water levels, 11 discharge
peaks and 2 storm surge barrier states). Secondly, the mean
value of the fragility curve is changed in iterative procedure
based on the calculated water level statistics until the failure
probability of the defence section matches the desired ﬂood
probability (with a fast routing model which does not con-
sider hydrodynamic interaction). The shape of the fragility
curve and thus its standard deviation is not changed.
Samples of fragility curves between different locations are
assumed to be uncorrelated, because most of the potential
breach locations are located far from each other.
3.3.3 Sampling evacuation response parameters
The expected number of fatalities as a result of a ﬂood de-
pends not only on the characteristics of the ﬂooding scenario,
but also on the population density and on the number of peo-
ple that have been evacuated before the onset of the ﬂooding.
The fractionof theinhabitants whocan be evacuateddepends
on the time available and the required time for evacuation,
which differ between the three subareas (tidal, non-tidal and
transition zone). In the probabilistic framework, the success
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rate of the evacuation, which varies between 0 and 90%, is
sampled from a probability distribution. Different distribu-
tions were derived for the three different regions: the non-
tidal river area, the tidal river area and the transition area,
based on Maaskant et al. (2009b) and also used in Beckers
and De Bruijn (2011). The evacuation fraction in the non-
tidal riverine area is on average 75%, while in the tidal river
area it is on average 15%. In the river-dominated area, an ac-
curate ﬂood forecast can generally be made several days in
advance and the road capacity is large in comparison to the
population density. In the tidal area, the forecast lead times
are typically less than a day, while the population density is
very high. This explains the small values for the evacuation
percentages in the tidal area compared to the non-tidal area.
For the transition area, the evacuation success is considered
correlated with the ﬂood threat: if the ﬂood is caused by a
high river discharge, the forecast lead time is usually longer
which increases the probability of a successful evacuation.
Therefore, in the transition area the evacuation percentage is
set equal to the sampled value for the river-dominated area
in those events which have a Rhine peak discharge higher
than 12000m3 s−1 at Lobith. For other events, the evacua-
tion percentage is set equal to the value sampled for the tidal
area. The sensitivity of the resulting FN curve for the level of
this threshold was found to be low.
3.4 Hydrodynamic model simulation
For each sampled event, the load (Rhine and Meuse dis-
charges, sea water level, functioning of the storm surge bar-
rier) and strength parameters (critical water levels for all de-
fence stretches) are input for a hydrodynamic model, which
simulates the water levels in the system. At each simulation
time step, river water levels are compared with the threshold
water levels for breach initiation. If a threshold is exceeded,
a breach is initiated and water will ﬂow through the breach
out of the river. Water is thus abstracted from the river, which
leads to a reduction of downstream water levels.
A defence breach is simulated by the opening of a struc-
ture which represents the breach in the model. The height of
the outlet is equal to the level of the area directly behind the
defence. The width of the structure opening grows in time
from zero at the time of breaching to a maximum of 200m
after 2 days. The growth rate is based on Verheij (2003).
In order to save computing time in the MCS, the inunda-
tion of the area behind the breach is simulated in a simple
way: the area behind the breach is represented by a reser-
voir. Due to this choice, the ﬂood modelling could be done
with an efﬁcient 1-D model. Of course, the Dutch protected
ﬂood plains do not exactly behave as reservoirs and the simu-
lated water levels in the reservoirs will thus not represent the
water levels in the ﬂoodplains correctly. The inﬂow in the
reservoirs, however, was found to be realistic and consistent
with previously carried out detailed 1-D/2-D ﬂood simula-
tions. The outﬂow from the river into the polders is thus rep-
resented well and this is what is needed most for obtaining
realistic estimates of the retention effect of breaches. The wa-
ter levels in the reservoirs itself are not used. Instead, for lo-
cations where breaches occur, existing 2-D ﬂood inundation
model results are taken from a database with pre-simulated
ﬂood scenarios (see next section).
The time step used in the hydrodynamic simulations is
1 hour. A full simulation period covers 1 month. The most
important boundary conditions are the discharge as a func-
tion of time at Lobith and Lith (Rhine and Meuse rivers), the
sea water level as a function of time (at Maasmond and the
Haringvliet) and a water-level–discharge relationship at the
downstream side of the IJssel river branch, which ﬂows into
the IJssel Lake (see Fig. 2).
The hydrodynamic simulations result for each sample in
the defence stretches where a breach occurred, the maximum
discharges through the breaches and the maximum water lev-
els in the river at the breach locations.
3.5 Translation of model outcomes to societal ﬂood
fatality risk measures
For those locations where breaches were simulated, the cor-
responding number of fatalities is taken from a database with
pre-calculated ﬂood scenarios and consequences. These fa-
tality ﬁgures are all determined for breaches at design con-
ditions and simulated with a 1-D/2-D or a 2-D model (De
Bruijn and Diermanse, 2013). The ﬂood patterns were trans-
lated to fatality ﬁgures with mortality functions (Jonkman,
2007; Maaskant et al., 2009a). The simulated inﬂow in the
polder areas may deviate from the inﬂow at design condi-
tions for which the pre-calculated ﬂood fatality ﬁgures are
available. However, the sensitivity of the number of fatalities
for small variations in breach inﬂow is small compared to
other uncertainties, such as the sensitivity to the estimate of
the number of breaches, the breach locations, and the evacu-
ation success rates.
A ﬁnal step of the method is to include evacuation. The
number of potential fatalities per breach location is multi-
plied by the fraction of inhabitants who were not evacuated.
A list is then generated which gives, for each of the 2000
simulated events and for each potential breach location the
number of fatalities and the total number of fatalities in the
event. This result is then used to construct the FN curve.
In the case study area, the number of fatalities due to a sin-
gle defence breach at design conditions varies between zero
and more than 3000. The highest fatality numbers are ex-
pected due to breaches along the Lek in the transition area
and just east of Rotterdam. At those locations, breaches may
result in extensive ﬂooding, large water depths and steep wa-
ter level rise rates. Furthermore, these defence sections pro-
tect densely populated areas and the evacuation possibilities
are limited there due to the short forecast lead time of storm
surges. In the non-tidal area, the evacuation possibilities are
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Figure 6. Effect of hydrodynamic interaction on the number of
breaches in the non-tidal part of the delta.
generally better and the population density is lower. Conse-
quently, the number of fatalities there is lower.
4 Results for the Rhine–Meuse delta
4.1 Results for the current ﬂood protection standard
The results presented here were obtained with a set of
fragility curves that were tuned to match the current protec-
tion standards (see Sect. 3.2). The selected MCS strategy re-
sulted in an acceptable convergence of the estimate of the
exceedance probabilities of N fatalities for N = 10,100,500
and 1000 and risk estimate (see Fig. 5).
Figure 6 shows the number of breaches in the non-tidal
area for a simulation in which hydrodynamic interaction is
taken into account and one in which this is not taken into
account. In the non-tidal area, a river ﬂood wave with a
peak value of about 16000m3 s−1 at Lobith (the current “de-
sign discharge” for the ﬂood defences in that area) causes
about 2–5 breaches (taking into account hydrodynamic in-
teraction). The effect of hydrodynamic interaction is clear:
it reduces the number of breaches especially due to extreme
events. A breach reduces the water levels downstream and
thereby the probability of additional breaches. If this alle-
viating effect is not considered, the number of breaches is
much larger. In the upper and tidal areas, the reduction of
the number of breaches due to hydrodynamic interaction is
about 80%. In the transition zone it is about 70%. If hy-
drodynamic interaction is taken into account, no events with
more than 20 breaches are found.
Figure 7 shows the resulting FN curve for the situation
in which the defences comply with the current ﬂood protec-
tion standard for a calculation including and excluding out-
ﬂow to inundated areas, thereby indicating the effect of hy-
drodynamic interaction on the FN curve. The effect is large,
especially for high values of N. The probability of events
with 10,000 or more fatalities decreases from about 9×10−5
to 3×10−7 a year if hydrodynamic interaction is taken into
account. The number of fatalities which is exceeded with a
probability of 1/10000 a year decreases from about 10000
to 3000.
Figure 7 also shows that the contribution of the three sub-
areas in the delta to the ﬂood fatality risk is not equal: the
non-tidal river area contributes most to the FN curve up to
8000 fatalities. For events with more than about 8000 fatal-
ities the tidal river area contributes most. In the tidal river
area ﬂoods are rare, but potentially catastrophic. In that area
many breaches may occur during a single storm surge event,
especially if the storm surge barrier fails to close.
The probability of a ﬂooding with at least one fatality is
about 1/70 per year. The highest ﬂood probability of a sin-
gle potential breach location is 1/320 (at Heerewaarden).
The PLL (potential loss of life), or annual expected num-
ber of fatalities, is about 3. The number of fatalities corre-
sponding to a probability of exceedance of 10−6 is 8400 for
the whole area. In the non-tidal river area, the probability of
high numbers of fatalities is very small. No events with more
than 10000 fatalities were identiﬁed in this area. However,
the probability of events with 10 to 100 fatalities is higher
than in the tidal and transition area (see Table 1).
In ﬂood risk management in the Netherlands, the C value
is often used as a measure for societal ﬂood risk (Vrijling et
al., 1995). This value is found by plotting a tangent of the
FN curve with a slope of −2 on a logarithmic scale. The
C value is then equal to the value where this line crosses
the line N = 1. The slope of −2 implies a risk-averse policy:
events with 1000 fatalities are considered 100 times more se-
rious than events with 100 fatalities. An example orientation
lineisplottedinFig.8.Insomeothercountries,arisk-neutral
approach is used, reﬂected by a line with a slope of −1. Al-
though the use of the C value as a tolerable risk indicator
is still under discussion, and no decision on a tolerable level
has been made, 1100 is frequently mentioned as a potential
acceptable value for the Netherlands. This value is based on
a comparison of different types of risks (man-made or natu-
ral, voluntary taken or imposed on inhabitants without their
consent) and tolerance levels for those risks (Vrijling et al.,
1995). Several risk indicators can be derived from the FN
curve, including the probability of an event with at least one
fatality, the PLL, the probability of more than N fatalities
and the number of fatalities associated with a certain prob-
ability (see Table 1). In the case study of the Rhine–Meuse
delta, the C value of the FN curve is determined by ﬂood sce-
narios with more than 1000 fatalities. To reduce the C value,
the number of fatalities of scenarios with 1000 or more fatal-
ities must be reduced. The scenarios which contribute most
to the C value are scenarios with a high Rhine discharge and
unsuccessful evacuation. These scenarios often include sev-
eral breaches in the central river area along the Lek River. In
general, these high discharge events will be forecast days in
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Figure 7. Resulting FN curves. Left: FN curve of the delta determined in two ways – with and without considering the effect of hydrodynamic
interaction. Right: contribution of the three zones to the total FN curve (with hydrodynamic interaction).
Table 1. Indicator values derived from the FN curve for the three subareas and the total area.
Indicators Tidal Upper river Transition Total area Total
(no hydrodynamic
interaction)
P (N >= 1) 1.36×10−3 1.01×10−2 3.03×10−3 1.36×10−2 1.4×10−2
P (N >= 100) 6.65×10−4 3.67×10−3 8.33×10−4 4.87×10−3 6.22×10−3
P (N >= 1000) 7.1×10−5 8.71×10−4 6.27×10−5 1.05×10−3 2.06×10−3
P (N >10000) 4.1×10−8 – – 2.89×10−7 9.39×10−5
N (P =<10−6) 7600 5800 3000 8400 39000
C (slope −2) 160 360 91 1574 14003
C (slope −1) 1.0 0.2 0.2 1.1 2.2
PLL 0.4 2.5 0.4 3.3 8.4
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Figure 8. Resulting FN curves for the three alternative ﬂood protection standard sets and an orientation line.
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advance. However, it may happen that levees fail before the
evacuation is completed.
4.2 Results for alternative ﬂood risk management
strategies
The method may be used to study the effect of alternative
ﬂood risk management strategies on societal risk. To illus-
trate this, three alternative strategies were analysed:
1. a situation in which all ﬂood defences comply with the
current safety standards (see previous section);
2. the actual situation which is expected in 2015 after
the implementation of planned projects for defence
strengthening; according to new insights in dike fail-
ure mechanisms, the ﬂood probabilities are much larger
than the current ﬂood protection standards would sug-
gest;
3. a potential alternative set of standards, which is linked
to the expected number of fatalities of the defence
strengths.
In strategy 3 all defence stretches have obtained a safety
standard based on the expected number of fatalities in the
case of a breach. The possibilities of evacuation (which dif-
fer per area) have been taken into account in these numbers.
Table 2 describes the relationship used to link the expected
numbers of fatalities with ﬂood protection standards.
To assess the societal risk corresponding with the alterna-
tive situations, the following steps have been carried out for
both alternative 2 and 3:
1. the mean values of the fragility curves have been
adapted in order to make them comply with the ﬂood
probabilities corresponding with the alternatives;
2. new critical water levels have been sampled for each de-
fence location; for the load parameters and evacuation
responses the same values have been used as for alter-
native 1 (river discharges, water levels at the sea and
storm surge barrier data);
3. ﬂood simulations have been run for all 2000 sampled
events;
4. the output has been translated to ﬂood fatality ﬁgures
per sampled event and to an FN curve.
Figure 8 shows the results. As expected, the societal
risk corresponding with alternative 2 (actual probabilities in
2015) with the highest ﬂood probabilities, is highest, and the
one corresponding with alternative 3 (probabilities of fail-
ure of each defence section is based on the expected number
of fatalities in case of a breach) is lowest. The differences
are largest for events which cause about 1000 fatalities. The
number of fatalities related to very rare ﬂood events is com-
parable for all three ﬂood risk management strategies.
Table 2. The relationship used between the expected number of fa-
talities given a breach (taking into account evacuation possibilities)
and the required safety standard as used in alternative 3.
Expected number Flood protection
of fatalities standard∗
>1000 1/100000
500–1000 1/30000
100–500 1/10000
50–100 1/3000
10–50 1/1000
<10 1/300
∗ Annual failure probability per defence section
considered independently of other defence sections.
5 Discussion
The FN curve presented in the previous section provides in-
sight into the level of the societal ﬂood risk if the ﬂood pro-
tection were to meet the current standards. It is not possible
to draw conclusions on whether the societal risk is tolerable
or too high, since no standards for societal ﬂood fatality risks
exist yet. It is, however, possible to determine which regions
or defence sections contribute most to the FN curve. The re-
sults show that the discharge-dominated part of the river area
contributes most to the societal ﬂood risk. Only for events
that cause 8000 fatalities or more is the contribution of the
tidal river area higher.
The increase of ﬂood protection levels clearly affects the
FN curve. Other measures than defence strengthening, such
as ﬂood impact mitigating measures, would shift the curve
to the left. Examples of such measures are improvements
in ﬂood warning, ﬂood preparedness or evacuation efﬁ-
ciency. An improved evacuation success rates could be taken
into account by changing the evacuation probability func-
tions. Measures which affect the number of fatalities given a
breach, e.g. improving building quality, raising buildings, or
measures which would reduce the water depth in the ﬂooded
area can also be considered by adapting the number of fatal-
ities corresponding with the breach location.
It is possible to use the FN curve to target risk-reducing
measures and to select those measures which shift the curve
downwards. If, for example, the probability of more than
10000 fatalities is considered too high, the measures should
be targeted on functioning of the Maeslant Barrier or on the
defence sections near Rotterdam, where the highest numbers
of fatalities are found. On the other hand, if the probability of
events with 1000 or more fatalities needs to be reduced, the
central river area should get the most attention. In all cases,
improvingtheprobabilityofasuccessfulevacuationcouldbe
an alternative to raising or strengthening of ﬂood protection.
The ﬂood fatality risk estimates are currently being used for
the development of ﬂood risk management strategies (Van
der Most et al., 2014).
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The developed modelling methodology has acceptable
computation times (9h for a full Monte Carlo analysis of
2000 samples on an Intel core i7 64bit, 16GbRAM). The
Monte Carlo approach has the additional advantage that
probabilistic results can be exempliﬁed by ﬂooding scenar-
ios.
The method can be applied to ﬂood risk assessment in
other deltas. It is especially suitable for large river deltas with
a developed infrastructure of ﬂood defences where hydrody-
namic interaction is important. For those areas the method
presented here has advantages over other methods.
6 Conclusions
The method presented in this paper combines a hydrody-
namic model with a probabilistic framework. It includes
a Monte Carlo simulation of external hydraulic forcing,
fragilitycurvesoftheleveesandofevacuationscenarios.The
sampled events are simulated by a 1-D hydrodynamic model
and combined with pre-simulated 2-D model results to ob-
tain fatality ﬁgures. Finally, an FN curve is derived, which
quantiﬁes exceedance frequencies of numbers of fatalities.
The combination of probabilistic and hydrodynamic model-
based risk analysis provides insight into the hydrodynamic
interactions within the system. The method is not computa-
tionally demanding and thus allows for the analysis of the
whole river delta and for the analysis of risks corresponding
with various ﬂood risk management strategies.
The method produces FN curves and various ﬂood risk in-
dicators as well as contributions of subareas or even indi-
vidual defence sections to the overall ﬂood risk. The results
clearly show the relevance of taking hydrodynamic interac-
tion into account in risk assessment. The ﬂood risk including
interactionsismuchlowerthanassessedwhenhydrodynamic
interaction is not taken into account. Using the method helps
to get a better understanding of the system and its spatial in-
terdependencies.
The results show that the discharge-dominated part of the
river area contributes most to the societal ﬂood fatality risk.
Only for events which cause 8000 fatalities or more does the
tidal area contribute most.
The method makes it possible to evaluate ﬂood protec-
tion or mitigation measures in terms of societal ﬂood fa-
tality risk reduction. The method has already been used to
analyse strategies involving defence strengthening, improv-
ing the failure probability of the Maeslant Barrier and im-
proving evacuation and other emergency response measures
(De Bruijn et al., 2014; Klijn et al., 2013).
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